“Hard” Cases, or Rather Bad Facts, Make Bad Law
I often applaud the legal reasoning of the appellate courts of the State of New York as I chronicle the court decisions on fraud topics in this Blog. Unfortunately, I do call out decisions when they misstate or confuse the law, and the recent decision of the Third Department in Jared V. v Nikki X, 2026 NY Slip Op 00176 (3d Dep’t Decided Jan. 15, 2026) indeed misstated and misapplied the governing law relating to forged documents. There is a loose legal adage that “bad facts” make bad law. Meaning, trying to squeeze a square set of facts into a legal round hole can torture and warp the correct legal principle. I explain below.
Forged Documents are Void, Not Merely Voidable
I have written often on the distinction between “void” and “voidable” documents or transactions.
As I have explained:
Forgeries Equal Void Transactions
As it relates to fraud, a document that contains a forged signature of the party who appears to have signed the document is simply not valid at all from the inception (the courts use the Latin phase “void ab initio”). In law, such a document is deemed never to have existed legally since the person who is claimed to have signed it and agreed to whatever is stated in it did not actually sign it and never intended to do so. That is the nature of the forgery. The legal consequence of the forgery is the utter non-existence of the thing forged. As the cases show, this actually happens rather frequently, unfortunately, with respect to deeds to real property. Someone forges the signature of the owner of the real property on a deed purporting to convey the real property to another. If the true owner did not sign that deed, the signature was forged by another, and the owner was unaware and did not consent or give authority to sign that deed, then the deed is simply deemed never to have existed. Anything that happens thereafter based upon that forged deed (such as imposing mortgages on the real property after the void conveyance) is not legally valid. That is the context of a “void” document or transaction. While there are many cases addressing forged deeds, the doctrine of rendering a forged document “void ab initio” and its rationale are not strictly limited to deeds.
Fraudulent Inducement
On the other hand, if the person whose signature is on the document really did sign it, the legal analysis is different. If that person was induced to sign that document by relying on false representations of a material nature (but did actually know he or she was signing the document), that is generally known as “fraudulent inducement.” That is a traditional fraud claim. Under those circumstances, the document in question is deemed “voidable.” It is not considered to be non-existent for all purposes and from the outset. The courts in those circumstances consider a host of factors whether to invalidate the document or transaction.
One consequence of a document being considered “void” is that there is no statute of limitations period by which to challenge the legal validity of a void document because the law considers the document never to have existed at all. While a leading New York Court of Appeals decision focused on a forged deed that was deemed void, the doctrine is not limited just to deeds.
Let’s review the cases and principles …
In Faison v Lewis, 25 NY3d 220 (2015), the Court of Appeals addressed the statute of limitations concerning deeds deemed to be void from fraud and forgeries. The Court explained the doctrines applicable to void and voidable documents as follows:
A forged deed that contains a fraudulent signature is distinguished from a deed where the signature and authority for conveyance are acquired by fraudulent means. In such latter cases, the deed is voidable. The difference in the nature of the two justifies this different legal status. A deed containing the title holder’s actual signature reflects “the assent of the will to the use of the paper or the transfer,” although it is assent “induced by fraud, mistake or misplaced confidence” (Marden, 160 NY at 50; see also Rosen v Rosen, 243 AD2d 618, 619 [2d Dept 1997]; 26A CJS, Deeds § 153 [“where the grantor knowingly executes the very instrument intended, but is induced to do so by some fraud in the treaty or by some fraudulent representation or pretense, the deed is merely voidable”]). Unlike a forged deed, which is void initially, a voidable deed, “until set aside, . . . has the effect of transferring the title to the fraudulent grantee, and . . . being thus clothed with all the evidences of good title, may incumber the property to a party who becomes a purchaser in good faith” (Marden, 160 NY at 50).
A forged deed, however, cannot convey good title, and “[i]t is legally impossible for any one [sic] to become a bona fide purchaser of real estate, or a purchaser at all, from one who never had any title, and that is this case” (id. at 56 [emphasis omitted]; see also Yin Wu v Wu, 288 AD2d 104, 105 [1st Dept 2001] [“A forged deed is void and conveys no title”]; 2-15 Warren’s Weed, New York Real Property § 15.01 [“A purchaser who takes title through a forged deed cannot be a bona fide purchaser, even if the purchaser did not have knowledge of the forgery”]). New York’s rule reflects a general well-established principle of real property law (see e.g. Harding v Ja Laur Corp., 20 Md App 209, 214, 315 A2d 132, 135 [1974] [“A forged deed . . . is void ab initio”]; Scott D. Erler, D.D.S. Profit Sharing Plan v Creative Fin. & Invs., L.L.C., 349 Mont 207, 214, 203 P3d 744, 750 [2009] [“forged conveyances are void ab initio and do not transfer title” (emphasis omitted)]; Brock v Yale Mtge. Corp., 287 Ga 849, 852, 700 SE2d 583, 586 [2010] [“we have also long recognized that a forged deed is a nullity and vests no title in a grantee”]; Akins v Vermast, 150 Or App 236, 241 n 7, 945 P2d 640, 643 n 7 [1997] [“If fraud is ‘in factum,’ such as a forged deed or a situation analogous to forgery, the deed is void ab initio and will not support subsequent title in any person” (emphasis omitted)]; First Natl. Bank in Albuquerque v Enriquez, 96 NM 714, 716, 634 P2d 1266, 1268 [1981] [“a forged deed is a void deed and transfers no interest”]; Williams v Warren, 214 Ark 506, 511, 216 SW2d 879, 881 [1949] [“No one can claim that an estate in land should be divested by forgery”]).
The Court went on to hold that no statute of limitations applied to an action to challenge a void deed because “a forged deed is void, not merely voidable. That legal status cannot be changed, regardless of how long it may take for the forgery to be uncovered.”
A case cited by the Court in Faison, Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v Munroe, 10 NY3d 18 (2008), in fact addressed the consequences of deeming an agreement void where the document was not a deed but an agreement that was void as against public policy. The Court in Riverside ruled:
Finally, the tenants argue that, since the agreement was made in 1996, this action, brought in 2004, is barred by the six year statute of limitations provided by CPLR 213(2) for “an action upon a contractual obligation or liability.” This argument misconceives the nature of a statute of limitations; it does not make an agreement that was void at its inception valid by the mere passage of time (Pacchiana v. Pacchiana, 94 A.D.2d 721, 462 N.Y.S.2d 256 [2d Dept.1983] ). This action is not one “upon a contractual obligation or liability,” but one to declare that no valid contractual obligations ever existed.
Riverside, 10 NY3d at 24.
The Court in Faison recognized this principle of void documents was not limited to deeds:
As this Court made clear in Riverside Syndicate, Inc. v. Munroe, a statute of limitations “does not make an agreement that was void at its inception valid by the mere passage of time” (10 N.Y.3d 18, 24, 853 N.Y.S.2d 263, 882 N.E.2d 875 [2008], citing Pacchiana v. Pacchiana, 94 A.D.2d 721, 462 N.Y.S.2d 256 [2d Dept.1983] ).
Faison, 25 NY3d at 226.
The courts have not limited the effect of a forged and, therefore, void document strictly to deeds. In fact, the Third Department itself has applied the doctrine to a forged contract, rendering it void. In Orlosky v Empire Sec. Sys., Inc., 230 AD2d 401, 403-04 (3d Dep’t 1997), the Court ruled:
Here, the only “contract” ostensibly between plaintiffs and Associates was the forged [retail installment contract] RIC. Under State law and general contract law, a forged signature renders a contract void ab initio2 (see, Ticor Title Guar. Co. v. E.F.D. Capital Group, 210 A.D.2d 841, 621 N.Y.S.2d 128, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 809, 810, 628 N.Y.S.2d 52, 651 N.E.2d 920; 10 Williston, Contracts § 1139, at 393; § 1139A, at 398 [3d ed 1967]; see also, UCC 3–401). Because there can be no meeting of the minds of the parties when a forgery has been perpetrated, no contract existed in the case at hand (see, Ticor Title Guar. Co. v. E.F.D. Capital Group, supra; see also, Moore & Moore Real Estate v. Aloi, 234 A.D.2d 683, 684, 650 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451) and the forged RIC could not form the basis for [Federal Truth–in–Lending] TILA *404 protection (see, Jensen v. Ray Kim Ford, supra, at 4),3 nor trigger the civil penalties of [New York’s Retail Installment Sales Act] RISA.
The Second Department has applied the void doctrine to documents other than deeds as well. In First Nat. Bank of Nevada v Williams, 74 AD3d 740, 741 (2d Dept 2010), the Court deemed a power of attorney void: “If a signature on a power of attorney is forged, the document executed by the purported attorney-in-fact pursuant to the power of attorney is void (see Hoffman v. Kraus, 260 A.D.2d 435, 436, 688 N.Y.S.2d 575; see generally Davis v. Dunnet, 239 N.Y. 338, 339–340, 146 N.E. 620).”
Third Department Gets it Wrong in Jared
While it is understandable why the Third Department in Jared had little to no tolerance for the plaintiff’s arguments, that does not justify ignoring recognized and established legal concepts.
In Jared, plaintiff and defendant were previously married and had one child together during the marriage. After the parties divorced, plaintiff was convicted of attempted sexual assault of a minor child and, in or around 2017, began serving an eight-year prison term imposed upon that conviction.
Defendant subsequently remarried and her new husband commenced a proceeding to adopt the child of the previous marriage, successfully arguing plaintiff had abandoned the child.
Plaintiff then commenced this action to challenge the adoption, alleging a host of claims, including “that his signature on the parties’ 2015 separation agreement was forged, that defendant had coerced him into signing the parties’ divorce papers under duress and that defendant made misrepresentations during the adoption proceedings.” The court below granted defendant summary judgment, dismissing plaintiff’s entre case, and the Third Department affirmed.
The Third Department essentially made mincemeat of each of plaintiff’s claims, finding them contradicted and demonstrably meritless. However, in addressing plaintiff’s claim that the separation agreement was forged and therefore no statute of limitations should apply to that claim, the Third Department went too far, incorrectly ruling:
Moreover, plaintiff’s reliance on Faison v Lewis (25 NY3d 220 [2015]) and its progeny for the proposition that the 2015 separation agreement was void ab initio and, thus, no statute of limitations defense exists, is misplaced. In Faison, the Court of Appeals concluded, based upon public policy considerations, that “challenges to forged deeds” are “distinct from other [fraud] claims, and exempt from a statute of limitations defense” (id. at 227 [emphasis added]). This case does not concern an allegedly forged deed and we decline to apply Faison and its progeny here (see Busher v Barry, ___ F3d ___, ___, 2021 WL 5071871, *4 n 1 [2d Cir 2021]).
The short, unsupported comment in the Second Circuit’s footnote in the summary decision in Busher is plainly insufficient precedent for the Third Department’s conclusion.
Commentary
While plaintiff’s claim that his signature was forged may have been factually implausible or otherwise unconvincing, the principle of law as applied to that claim should have been corrected acknowledged and applied. It appears clear that the Third Department’s flat restriction of the void doctrine to deeds misapplies the core rationale in Faison and longstanding New York principles. The controlling concept is the absence of genuine assent. When a signature is forged, there is no contract, no delegation of authority, and no valid instrument—deed or otherwise. The legal nullity flows from the forgery itself, not the instrument’s type. New York decisions recognize this across many contexts and documents. Faison’s policy concern—preventing time from laundering a nullity—does not hinge on real property. It rests on the principle that courts do not enforce what never existed.